Why $$ price $$ corrupts thinghood and us

It is hard to think of things without thinking of them as having a price. In fancier terms: things appear as almost independently unintelligible of their status as commodities. Back to natural talk: why is this so? One might think that it is just the result of something contingent. That is, something that does not pertain the very notion of a thing, but that it is rather the result of our society. Since in our society we buy and sell things to live, then things that appear in society appear as things to be bought or sold. But if this is just something that happens to happen to things when they appear in a society that uses money, then it is not in the very essence of things to have a price.
What happens to a thing when it has a price?
	A price becomes the measurement of the thing, the abbreviation or shortcut for its value.
But is is value of the thing thinkable without the use of the shortcut which is money?
The answer must be obviously yes! The chair’s value is its capacity for us to sit in it comfortably.
What happens to things when their value is monetary?
More fundamentally, what happens to us when we can only think of things’ value as entangled with their price?
	Obviously, what happens to us is a cognitive dissonance. Because things are material entities with a purpose. And their purpose should be what is apprehended in the true measuring of their worth. But, when prices come, then there is no longer the need for the apprehension of purpose. What happens to us is that we no longer use our capacity for the grasping of purpose. We use the shortcut of price for the measuring of the worth of the thing. Then we do not use our human capacity for valuation to establish the true value of the thing. Thus, we become stupid. But worse: because we become stupid, in the sense of incapable of assessing things’ true worth, we become dependent on the Setters of Price to tell us the worth of things. Now, in an older post, I explained how Thing establishment is able to continue because people have lost the capacity to make a single thing. Then this explains a two-fold state of dependency: (a) we do not know how to make things, or we are practically impotent; and (b) we do not know what things are even worth, thus we care axiologically impotent. We shall add a further form of impotence that the situation we find ourselves in within this Thing-centered world, namely, our theoretical impotence, that we do not even know how to know.